Christophe Heintz Publications

@article{Scott-Phillips2023,
	author = {Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},
	title = {Animal Communication in Linguistic and Cognitive Perspective},
	journal = {Annual Review of Linguistics},
	volume = {9},
	number = {1},
	pages = {93-111},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1146/annurev-linguistics-030421-061233},
	keywords={communication},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-030421-061233},
	abstract = { Detailed comparative studies have revealed many surface similarities between linguistic communication and the communication of nonhumans. How should we interpret these discoveries in linguistic and cognitive perspective? We review the literature with a specific focus on analogy (similar features and function but not shared ancestry) and homology (shared ancestry). We conclude that combinatorial features of animal communication are analogous but not homologous to natural language. Homologies are found instead in cognitive capacities of attention manipulation, which are enriched in humans, making possible many distinctive forms of communication, including language use. We therefore present a new, graded taxonomy of means of attention manipulation, including a new class we call Ladyginian, which is related to but slightly broader than the more familiar class of Gricean interaction. Only in the latter do actors have the goal of revealing specifically informative intentions. Great ape interaction may be best characterized as Ladyginian but not Gricean. }
}

Detailed comparative studies have revealed many surface similarities between linguistic communication and the communication of nonhumans. How should we interpret these discoveries in linguistic and cognitive perspective? We review the literature with a specific focus on analogy (similar features and function but not shared ancestry) and homology (shared ancestry). We conclude that combinatorial features of animal communication are analogous but not homologous to natural language. Homologies are found instead in cognitive capacities of attention manipulation, which are enriched in humans, making possible many distinctive forms of communication, including language use. We therefore present a new, graded taxonomy of means of attention manipulation, including a new class we call Ladyginian, which is related to but slightly broader than the more familiar class of Gricean interaction. Only in the latter do actors have the goal of revealing specifically informative intentions. Great ape interaction may be best characterized as Ladyginian but not Gricean.

@article{scott2023great,
	title={Great ape interaction: Ladyginian but not Gricean},
	author={Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},
	journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
	volume={120},
	number={42},
	pages={e2300243120},
	year={2023},
	publisher={National Acad Sciences},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ?special case of? framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction?for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ?displaced,? and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning?are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species? cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans,language ready.},
	doi={https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.230024312}
}

Nonhuman great apes inform one another in ways that can seem very humanlike. Especially in the gestural domain, their behavior exhibits many similarities with human communication, meeting widely used empirical criteria for intentionality. At the same time, there remain some manifest differences, most obviously the enormous range and scope of human expression. How to account for these similarities and differences in a unified way remains a major challenge. Here, we make a key distinction between the expression of intentions (Ladyginian) and the expression of specifically informative intentions (Gricean), and we situate this distinction within a ?special case of? framework for classifying different modes of attention manipulation. We hence describe how the attested tendencies of great ape interaction?for instance, to be dyadic rather than triadic, to be about the here-and-now rather than ?displaced,? and to have a high degree of perceptual resemblance between form and meaning?are products of its Ladyginian but not Gricean character. We also reinterpret video footage of great ape gesture as Ladyginian but not Gricean, and we distinguish several varieties of meaning that are continuous with one another. We conclude that the evolutionary origins of linguistic meaning lie not in gradual changes in communication systems, but rather in gradual changes in social cognition, and specifically in what modes of attention manipulation are enabled by a species? cognitive phenotype: first Ladyginian and in turn Gricean. The second of these shifts rendered humans, and only humans,language ready.

@article{bonalumi2022communication,
	title={Communication and deniability: Moral and epistemic reactions to denials},
	author={Bonalumi, Francesca and Bumin, Feride Belma and Scott-Phillips, Thom and Heintz, Christophe},
	year={2023},
	journal={Frontiers in Psychology},
	publisher={Frontiers},
	doi={https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1073213},
	url_pdf={https://psyarxiv.com/rhsyk/download/?format=pdf},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker?s incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences? moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience?s interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers?) incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker?s utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was ?literally? said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly	at (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved.}
}

People often deny having meant what the audience understood. Such denials occur in both interpersonal and institutional contexts, such as in political discourse, the interpretation of laws and the perception of lies. In practice, denials have a wide range of possible effects on the audience, such as conversational repair, reinterpretation of the original utterance, moral judgements about the speaker, and rejection of the denial. When are these different reactions triggered? What factors make denials credible? There are surprisingly few experimental studies directly targeting such questions. Here, we present two pre-registered experiments focusing on (i) the speaker?s incentives to mislead their audience, and (ii) the impact of speaker denials on audiences? moral and epistemic assessments of what has been said. We find that the extent to which speakers are judged responsible for the audience?s interpretations is modulated by their (the speakers?) incentives to mislead, but not by denials themselves. We also find that people are more willing than we expected to revise their interpretation of the speaker?s utterance when they learn that the ascribed meaning is false, regardless of whether the speaker is known to have had incentives to deceive their audience. In general, these findings are consistent with the idea that communicators are held responsible for the cognitive effects they trigger in their audience; rather than being responsible for, more narrowly, only the effects of what was ?literally? said. In light of our findings, we present a new, cognitive analysis of how audiences react to denials, drawing in particular on the Relevance Theory approach to communication. We distinguish in particular: (a) the spontaneous and intuitive re-interpretation of the original utterance in light of a denial; (b) the attribution of responsibility to the speaker for the cognitive effects of what is communicated; and (c) the reflective attribution of a particular intention to the speaker, which include argumentative considerations, higher-order deniability and reputational concerns. Existing experimental work, including our own, aims mostly at (a) and (b), and does not adequately control for (c). Deeper understanding of what can be credibly denied will be hindered unless and until this methodological problem is resolved.

@article{heintz2023expression,
	title={Expression unleashed: The evolutionary and cognitive foundations of human communication},
	author={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},
	journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
	volume={46},
	pages={1-19},
	year={2023},
	publisher={Cambridge University Press},
	url_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/78C4D9A7771514275AF893D668B82EF2/S0140525X22000012a.pdf/expression-unleashed-the-evolutionary-and-cognitive-foundations-of-human-communication.pdf},
	url_video={https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pg7HRjjsAWk&t=132s},
	doi={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X22000012},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={ Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communi- cation to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species? social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species com- parisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmat- ics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.}
}

Human expression is open-ended, versatile, and diverse, ranging from ordinary language use to painting, from exaggerated displays of affection to micro-movements that aid coordination. Here we present and defend the claim that this expressive diversity is united by an interrelated suite of cognitive capacities, the evolved functions of which are the expression and recognition of informative intentions. We describe how evolutionary dynamics normally leash communi- cation to narrow domains of statistical mutual benefit, and how expression is unleashed in humans. The relevant cognitive capacities are cognitive adaptations to living in a partner choice social ecology; and they are, correspondingly, part of the ordinarily developing human cognitive phenotype, emerging early and reliably in ontogeny. In other words, we identify distinctive features of our species? social ecology to explain how and why humans, and only humans, evolved the cognitive capacities that, in turn, lead to massive diversity and open-endedness in means and modes of expression. Language use is but one of these modes of expression, albeit one of manifestly high importance. We make cross-species com- parisons, describe how the relevant cognitive capacities can evolve in a gradual manner, and survey how unleashed expression facilitates not only language use, but also novel behaviour in many other domains too, focusing on the examples of joint action, teaching, punishment, and art, all of which are ubiquitous in human societies but relatively rare in other species. Much of this diversity derives from graded aspects of human expression, which can be used to satisfy informative intentions in creative and new ways. We aim to help reorient cognitive pragmat- ics, as a phenomenon that is not a supplement to linguistic communication and on the periphery of language science, but rather the foundation of the many of the most distinctive features of human behaviour, society, and culture.

@article{heintz2022being,
	title={Being ostensive (reply to commentaries on `Expression unleashed')},
	author={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},
	journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
	volume={46},
	pages={45-53},
	year={2023},
	publisher={Cambridge University Press},
	url_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/78C4D9A7771514275AF893D668B82EF2/S0140525X22000012a.pdf/expression-unleashed-the-evolutionary-and-cognitive-foundations-of-human-communication.pdf},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={One of our main goals with ?Expression unleashed? was to highlight the distinctive, ostensive nature of human communication, and the many roles that ostension can play in human behavior and society. The commentaries we received forced us to be more precise about several aspects of this thesis. At the same time, no commentary chal- lenged the central idea that the manifest diversity of human expres- sion is underpinned by a common cognitive unity. Our reply is organized around six issues: (1) languages and their cultural evolu- tion; (2) the pervasiveness of expression in human behavior; (3) arti- ficial intelligence and ostensive communication; (4) communication in other animals; (5) the ecology and evolution of ostensive commu- nication; and (6) biolinguistics and pragmatics.}
}

One of our main goals with ?Expression unleashed? was to highlight the distinctive, ostensive nature of human communication, and the many roles that ostension can play in human behavior and society. The commentaries we received forced us to be more precise about several aspects of this thesis. At the same time, no commentary chal- lenged the central idea that the manifest diversity of human expres- sion is underpinned by a common cognitive unity. Our reply is organized around six issues: (1) languages and their cultural evolu- tion; (2) the pervasiveness of expression in human behavior; (3) arti- ficial intelligence and ostensive communication; (4) communication in other animals; (5) the ecology and evolution of ostensive commu- nication; and (6) biolinguistics and pragmatics.

@article{altinok2022if,
	title={If you presume relevance, you don't need a bifocal lens},
	author={Altinok, Nazli and Tatone, Denis and Kiraly, Ildiko and Heintz, Christophe and Gergely, Gyorgy},
	journal={The Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
	volume={45},
	pages={e250},
	year={2022},
	url_pdf={https://psyarxiv.com/r7dp2/download},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/ affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.}
}

We argue for a relevance-guided learning mechanism to account for both innovative reproduction and faithful imitation by focusing on the role of communication in knowledge transmission. Unlike bifocal stance theory, this mechanism does not require a strict divide between instrumental and ritual-like actions, and the goals they respectively fulfill (material vs. social/ affiliative), to account for flexibility in action interpretation and reproduction.

@article{szegHofi2022institutions,
	title={Institutions of epistemic vigilance: The case of the newspaper press},
	author={Szegofi, Akos and Heintz, Christophe},
	journal={Social Epistemology},
	volume={36},
	number={5},
	pages={613-628},
	year={2022},
	publisher={Taylor \& Francis},
	doi={https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109532},
	url_pdf={https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02691728.2022.2109532},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={Can people efficiently navigate the modern communication environment, and if yes, how? We hypothesize that in addition to psycholo- gical capacities of epistemic vigilance, which evaluate the epistemic value of communicated information, some social institutions have evolved for the same function. Certain newspapers for instance, implement processes, distributed among several experts and tools, whose function is to curate information. We analyze how information curation is done at the institutional level and what challenges it meets. We also investigate what factors favor the cultural evolution of institu- tions of epistemic vigilance: these include people's preference for accurate and reliable information and their ability to assess commu- nicated information in view of the source's epistemic authority; but also contingent historical factors that make it worth, or not, to contribute to the maintenance of institutions of epistemic vigilance. We conclude the paper by considering the challenges and vulnerabilities of these institutions in the Digital Age.}
}

Can people efficiently navigate the modern communication environment, and if yes, how? We hypothesize that in addition to psycholo- gical capacities of epistemic vigilance, which evaluate the epistemic value of communicated information, some social institutions have evolved for the same function. Certain newspapers for instance, implement processes, distributed among several experts and tools, whose function is to curate information. We analyze how information curation is done at the institutional level and what challenges it meets. We also investigate what factors favor the cultural evolution of institu- tions of epistemic vigilance: these include people's preference for accurate and reliable information and their ability to assess commu- nicated information in view of the source's epistemic authority; but also contingent historical factors that make it worth, or not, to contribute to the maintenance of institutions of epistemic vigilance. We conclude the paper by considering the challenges and vulnerabilities of these institutions in the Digital Age.

@article{bonalumi2020commitment,
	title={Commitment and communication: Are we committed to what we mean, or what we say?},
	author={Bonalumi, Francesca and Scott-Phillips, Thom and Tacha, Julius and Heintz, Christophe},
	journal={Language and Cognition},
	volume={12},
	number={2},
	pages={360-384},
	year={2020},
	publisher={Cambridge University Press},
	doi={https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.2},
	url_pdf={https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/763D5D1BD8590F1CD56F62A562842D03/S1866980820000022a.pdf/commitment-and-communication-are-we-committed-to-what-we-mean-or-what-we-say.pdf},
	keywords={communication},
	abstract={Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the con- trary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying/meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to `what is meant', and not simply to `what is said'. Our findings add to the experi- mental literature showing that the saying?meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of `what is meant'.}
}

Are communicators perceived as committed to what they actually say (what is explicit), or to what they mean (including what is implicit)? Some research claims that explicit communication leads to a higher attribution of commitment and more accountability than implicit communication. Here we present theoretical arguments and experimental data to the con- trary. We present three studies exploring whether the saying/meaning distinction affects commitment attribution in promises, and, crucially, whether commitment attribution is further modulated by the degree to which the hearer will actually rely on the promise. Our results support the conclusion that people perceive communicators to be committed to `what is meant', and not simply to `what is said'. Our findings add to the experi- mental literature showing that the saying?meaning distinction is not as pivotal to social relations as often assumed, and that its role in commitment attribution might be overestimated. The attribution of commitment is strongly dependent on the (mutually known) relevance of `what is meant'.

@inproceedings{heintz2020gradualism,
	title={Gradualism in the evolution of ostensive communication},
	author={Heintz, Christophe and Scott-Phillips, Thom},
	booktitle={The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference},
	pages={144-154},
	year={2020},
	url_pdf={https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_3190925/component/file_3260022/content#page=165},
	keywords={communication},
	Abstract = {Most human communication is ostensive, and language use is the paradigmatic example. Here we offer a novel hypothesis about its gradual evolution in humans. We describe the graded distinctions between ostensive communication and other forms of intentional manipulation of mental states. On this basis, we show how ostensive communication could have evolved as a gradual empowerment of other social cognitive abilities to manipulate the mental states of others. We then describe the sort of social ecology in which ostensive communication is adaptive and evolutionarily stable. Specifically, we propose that cognitive processes specialised for ostensive communication will evolve only in a partner choice social ecology, where audience are able to withdraw their trust and select their informants with a high degree of possibility. We conclude with a novel suggestion about the nature of much non-human primate communication.}
}

Most human communication is ostensive, and language use is the paradigmatic example. Here we offer a novel hypothesis about its gradual evolution in humans. We describe the graded distinctions between ostensive communication and other forms of intentional manipulation of mental states. On this basis, we show how ostensive communication could have evolved as a gradual empowerment of other social cognitive abilities to manipulate the mental states of others. We then describe the sort of social ecology in which ostensive communication is adaptive and evolutionarily stable. Specifically, we propose that cognitive processes specialised for ostensive communication will evolve only in a partner choice social ecology, where audience are able to withdraw their trust and select their informants with a high degree of possibility. We conclude with a novel suggestion about the nature of much non-human primate communication.

@article{mercier2015experts,
	title={Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning},
	author={Mercier, Hugo and Trouche, Emmanuel and Yama, Hiroshi and Heintz, Christophe and Girotto, Vittorio},
	Abstract={ 
	Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem�the Wason selection task�and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies.},
	doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2014.981582},
	url_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Mercier-2015-Experts.pdf},
	journal={Thinking \& Reasoning},
	volume={21},
	number={3},
	pages={341-355},
	year={2015},
	publisher={Routledge},
	keywords={economic cognition, communication}
}

Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem�the Wason selection task�and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies.

@article{mercier2014scientists,
	title={ Scientists' argumentative reasoning},
	author={Mercier, Hugo and Heintz, Christophe},
	Abstract = {Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner's initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, reasoners are well able to evaluate others' reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one's mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative  mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists' reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science.},
	journal={Topoi},
	volume={33},
	number={2},
	pages={513-524},
	year={2014},
	Doi = {10.1007/s11245-013-9217-4},
	Keywords = {scientific cognition, communication},
	url_pdf = {http://christophe.heintz.free.fr/papers/Mercier-Heintz-2014-Scientists.pdf},
	publisher={Springer Netherlands}
}

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner's initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, reasoners are well able to evaluate others' reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one's mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists' reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science.

@article{Morin2011,
	Abstract = {Naturalistic accounts of culture, based on evolutionary psychology and theories of cultural evolution, can deal with the meaning of public symbols. There have been, indeed, several interesting proposals to naturalize the study of signs and their meaning. Kockelman' paper---Biosemiosis, technocognition and sociogenesis---provides such a proposal. It draws on two theoretical traditions: the semiotic study of natural signs (Peirce 1868) and the selectionist account of signals proposed by Ruth Millikan (1984). We feel the pull of both approaches, but we fundamentally disagree with the way they account for human communication. We argue that Gricean theories of communication provide a better account of interpretation and communication.},
	Author = {Morin, Olivier and Heintz, Christophe},
	Journal = {Current Anthropology},
	Keywords = {cultural evolution, communication},
	Number = {5},
	Pages = {732-733},
	Title = {{The Specificity of Human Communication Eludes Semiotic Theories}},
	Volume = {52},
	Year = {2011}}

Naturalistic accounts of culture, based on evolutionary psychology and theories of cultural evolution, can deal with the meaning of public symbols. There have been, indeed, several interesting proposals to naturalize the study of signs and their meaning. Kockelman' paper—Biosemiosis, technocognition and sociogenesis—provides such a proposal. It draws on two theoretical traditions: the semiotic study of natural signs (Peirce 1868) and the selectionist account of signals proposed by Ruth Millikan (1984). We feel the pull of both approaches, but we fundamentally disagree with the way they account for human communication. We argue that Gricean theories of communication provide a better account of interpretation and communication.

@article{Dan2010,
	Abstract = {Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.},
	Author = {Sperber, Dan and Clément, Fabrice and Heintz, Christophe and Mascaro, Olivier and Mercier, Hugo and Origgi, Gloria and Wilson, Deirde},
	Doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x},
	Issn = {02681064},
	Journal = {Mind and Language},
	Keywords = {communication, trust},
	Month = aug,
	Number = {4},
	Pages = {359-393},
	Publisher = {WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC},
	Title = {{Epistemic Vigilance}},
	Url_pdf = {http://www.dan.sperber.fr/wp-content/uploads/Epistemic-Vigilance-published.pdf},
	Volume = {25},
	Year = {2010}}

Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.

@article{Heintz2010,
	Author = {Heintz, Christophe and Taraborelli, Dario},
	Doi = {10.1007/s13164-010-0046-8},
	Issn = {18785158},
	Journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
	Keywords = {trust},
	Month = dec,
	Number = {4},
	Pages = {477-482},
	Publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
	Title = {{Folk Epistemology. The Cognitive Bases of Epistemic Evaluation}},
	keywords={trust, communication},
	Volume = {1},
	Year = {2010}}

@article{Heintz2006,
	Abstract = {I analyse the impact of search engines on our cognitive and epistemic practices. For that purpose, I describe the processes of assessment of documents on the Web as relying on distributed cognition. Search engines together with Web users, are distributed assessment systems whose task is to enable efficient allocation of cognitive resources of those who use search engines. Specifying the cognitive function of search engines within these distributed assessment systems allows interpreting anew the changes that have been caused by search engine technologies. I describe search engines as implementing reputation systems and point out the similarities with other reputation systems. I thus call attention to the continuity in the distributed cognitive processes that determine the allocation of cognitive resources for information gathering from others.},
	Author = {Heintz, Christophe},
	Doi = {10.1075/pc.14.2.15hei},
	Journal = {Pragmatics and Cognition},
	Keywords = {communication, trust},
	Number = {2},
	Pages = {387-409},
	Publisher = {John Benjamins Publishing Company},
	Title = {Web search engines and distributed assessment systems},
	url_pdf={https://philpapers.org/archive/HEIWSE-2.pdf},
	Volume = {14},
	Year = {2006}}

I analyse the impact of search engines on our cognitive and epistemic practices. For that purpose, I describe the processes of assessment of documents on the Web as relying on distributed cognition. Search engines together with Web users, are distributed assessment systems whose task is to enable efficient allocation of cognitive resources of those who use search engines. Specifying the cognitive function of search engines within these distributed assessment systems allows interpreting anew the changes that have been caused by search engine technologies. I describe search engines as implementing reputation systems and point out the similarities with other reputation systems. I thus call attention to the continuity in the distributed cognitive processes that determine the allocation of cognitive resources for information gathering from others.